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I.
This

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Court

has

jurisdiction

over

this

matter

pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section
3 and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The sole issue presented for review is whether the
immunity

provision

Discipline

of

Rule

of the Utah

State

against defendant/appellee
because

it provides

immunity

of

the

Procedures

Bar precludes

Utah

immunity

it provides

XVI

of

this action

State Bar ("Bar") either

to the Bar or because the

to all Bar disciplinary

personnel

eliminates the basis of any action against the Bar.

III.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

In reviewing the district court's order granting
the Bar's motion to dismiss, this Court should construe the
complaint

in

plaintiffs/appellees

the

light

Ernest

most

L.

antf

("Baileys") and indulge all reasonable
favor.

favorable
Sharon

S.

to
Bailey

influences in its

Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zioris First National Bank,

767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).

In so doing, the Court need

not, however, accept extrinsic facts not pleaded,

Allred v.

Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979).

IV.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an action against the Bar seeking damages

resulting

from

the

Bar's

alleged

failure

"to

protect

[Baileys] from the known negligent behavior of an attorney
known to have engaged in !a pattern of misconduct including
negligence and incompetence'n

(verified complaint, para. 28

at R. p. 8). Baileys also seek a writ of mandamus to compel
the Bar to take appropriate disciplinary action against J.
Richard Calder and to proceed on claims against the client
security fund.
B.

Course of Proceedings
In response to Baileys' verified complaint, the Bar

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Third Judicial District

Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, granted the Bar's motion and
entered an order of dismissal on February 28, 1990.
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C.

Disposition in the Court Below
The lower court granted the Bar's Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss and

entered

an order of dismissal on

February 28f 1990.
D.

Statement of Facts
On December 15f 1987, Baileys filed their verified

complaint against the Bar initiating the present action.

In

their verified complaint, Baileys allege that on March 21,
1978 they hired J. Richard Calder (Calder) to handle their
bankruptcy case (verified complaint, para. 8 at R. p. 5).
Calder allegedly omitted

from Baileys1

certain creditors

list of creditors resulting in plaintiff Ernest L. Bailey's
inability to obtain a chauffeur's license and consequently
the loss of two jobs (verified complaint, paras. 8-10 at R.
p. 5)

The verified

complaint

further alleges that from

March, 1979 until August, 1983, the Baileys made attempts to
have Calder rectify his mistake (verified complaint, para.
10 at R. p. 5). Baileys allege in their complaint that they
dis-covered

in

December

of

1986

that

the

Bar

knew of

Calderfs pattern of incompetence and that the Utah State Bar
Ethics Committee had filed a complaint with the Board of
Commissioners

of

the

Utah

State

Bar

on

June

17, 1983

(verified complaint, paras. 12 and 25 at R. pps. 4 and 6).
Under

the

heading

"Cause

of Action", Baileys' verified

complaint then alleges as follows:
-3-

Defendant, having the responsibility
to
regulate
the
conduct
of
attorneys, breached a fiduciary duty
to the public in general, and to the
plaintiff, in particular, to protect
him
from
the
known
negligent
behavior of an attorney known to
have engaged
in a "pattern of
misconduct including negligence and
incompetence •"
Because of the negligent conduct of
Plaintiff's
former
attorney, J.
Richard Calder (who was allowed to
practice law through Defendants
negligence) Plaintiff, Ernest L.
Bailey, was denied a livelihood in
his chosen profession and denies
[sic] competent representation in a
bankruptcy Court,
In

their

demand

for

relief,

the

Baileys

seek

damages "for failure to protect Plaintiffs from a negligent
attorney who provided incompetent representation...."
demand

for relief also requests

Their

a "writ of mandamus to

compel the Utah State Bar to take appropriate disciplinary
action against attorney, J. Richard Calder...."

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the
Utah

State Bar should

be read

immunity to the Utah State Bar.

broadly

enough

to extend

Even if the Bar itself does

not have immunity under that provision, the immunity granted
to all Bar disciplinary

personnel

-4-

removes the basis for

Baileys1

action

against

the

Bar,

Furthermore/

even if

Baileys' verified complaint is construed not to relate to
disciplinary proceedings/ it does npt state a valid claim
against the Bar.
VI.

ARGUMENT

In response to the Baileys' verified complaint, the
Bar filed a motion to dismiss premised on Rule XVI(a) of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar which grants
all disciplinary personnel of the Utah State Bar absolute
immunity from civil suit or liability for conduct in the
course of their official responsibilities.

The Bar argued

that that provision extends immunity to the Bar and that,
even

if

it

does

not,

the

immunity

granted

to

Bar

disciplinary personnel shields the Bar from liability.

The

district court adopted the Bar's argument and granted its
motion to dismiss.

The sole issue before this Court is

whether the district court properly granted the Bar's motion
to dismiss.
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the
Utah State Bar provides as follows:
Disciplinary Personnel Immune from
Civil Suit.
All members of the
Committee, Board, hearing committees, Bar
Counsel, disciplinary
staff
and
other
persons
duly
authorized to act in disciplinary
proceedings under these rules shall

absolutely immune from civil suit or
liability for any conduct in the
course of their official responsibilities.
Although this rule does not specifically name the Bar, the
intent of the provision was to provide a broad immunity to
allow the Bar through its disciplinary personnel to conduct
disciplinary
civil

proceedings without

liability.

That

the threat of

immunity

provision

incurring
should

be

construed broadly enough to extend immunity to the Bar.
Even

if Rule

XVI (a) does not explicitly extend

immunity to the Bar, the immunity it provides to all Bar
disciplinary personnel shields the Bar from liability.

The

Bar is an organization which, similar to a corporation, acts
through

designated

representatives.

As

to

disciplinary

matters, the Bar acts through individuals serving in various
capacities:
Board

of

On the Ethics and Discipline Committee, on the

Commissioners,

Counsel, and

Bar Counsel

on

hearing

staff, and

related to disciplinary matters.

committees,

as

Bar

in other capacities

Any tort liability the Bar

incurs is through the acts of the Bar's representatives.
Since those involved in the disciplinary process are immune
from suit and liability, the basis upon which the Bar's
liability

rests

is

removed

and

liable.

-6-

the

Bar

cannot

be held

This

conclusion

is

supported

by

the

case

of

Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d

625, (Utah

1972).

a master's

In that case, this Court considered

liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the
liability of the servant had been eliminated.

The Court

stated as follows:
Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the liability of the
master
to a third
person for
injuries inflicted by a servant...is
derivative and secondary....
[T]he
exoneration of the servant removes
the foundation upon which to impute
negligence to the master.
Id. at p. 627.
This case is consistent with the general principle
stated at 53 Am.Jur.2d Master & Servant §406 as follows:
In a case where the employer's
liability depends solely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior,
recovery cannot be had against an
employer for damages resulting from
the alleged wrongful or negligent
act of the employeev after the
employee has been discharged from
personal liability.... This is not
upon the theory that the employer is
denied the right to recover over
against the employee, but upon the
ground
that the sole basis of
liability
is -he negligence or
wrongdoing of the employee imputed
to the employer under the doctrine
of
respondeat
superior;
the
acquittal
of
the
employee
of
wrongdoing
conclusively negatives
liability of the employer.

_"7_

See also Vaughn v. Texaco, Inc., 631 P.2d 1334, 1337
(Ok. Ct.App. 1981) ("It is a well settled rule of law that
where a plaintiff's cause of action is predicated on the
alleged acts of negligence by an employee (agent) which in
turn is attributable to the employer (principal) under the
rule of respondeat superior, and the employee

(agent) is

exonerated from blame, the employer (principal) is likewise
exonerated.") and Nyman v. MacRae Bros. Const. Co., 418 P.2d
253, 254 (Wa. 1966) ("There can be no liability as a master
unless the servant is liable.")
Under the immunity provision of Rule XVI of the
Procedures

of

Discipline

of

the

Utah

State

Bar,

all

individuals whose negligence or fault could be imputed to
the Bar are immune.

The basis upon which Baileys claim

recovery

Bar

against

the

is eliminated.

The

district

court's dismissal of Baileys' verified complaint was proper
and should be affirmed by this Court.
In light of the foregoing, Baileys argue that their
complaint does not state a claim relating to a disciplinary
proceeding and that the Bar's argument based on Rule XVI
does not apply.

Baileys' argument is inconsistent with the

language of their verified complaint.
As

they

acknowledge

in

their

brief,

Baileys'

verified complaint alleges "that the State Bar failed in its
duty to both the public and the Baileys to protect them from
-8-

known pattern of negligence and incompetence by a member of
the State Bar" (Brief of Appellant, p. 16). Baileys allege
that Calder "was allowed to practice law through Defendant's
negligence" (verified complaint, para. 29 at R. p. 8). In
their demand for relief, Baileys seek a judgment for damages
"for failure to protect Plaintiffs frpm a negligent attorney
who

provided

incompetent

representation

in

Federal

Bankruptcy Courts" (verified complaint, p. 7 at R. p. 8) and
seek

a

writ

of

mandamus

to

compel

the

Bar

to

"take

appropriate disciplinary actions against.. .Calder" (verified
complaint, p. 8 at R. p. 9).
Baileys claim the Bar should have done something
"to protect them from a known pattern of negligence and
incompetence by" Calder.
Baileys

claim

disciplinary

that

Such language can mean only that

the

Bar

should

action against Calder.

have

taken

some

As indicated above,

however, the Bar is shielded from liability either directly
through the immunity provision of Rul^ XVI of the Procedures

_ Q _

of Discipline of the Utah State Bar or indirectly through
the immunity granted to all Bar disciplinary personnel.*
Even if Baileys' verified complaint

is construed

not to state a claim relating to a disciplinary proceeding,
it does not state a proper claim.

In arguing that their

complaint does not state a claim relating to a disciplinary
proceeding, Baileys seem to argue in their brief that their
complaint

sets

forth

two

separate

claims

which

unaffected by the immunity provision of Rule XVI.

are

The two

claims which the Baileys appear to argue their complaint
makes are (1 ) that the Bar failed to disclose to them that
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings and (2)
that

the

Baileys

received

bad

advice

from

Bar Counsel.

Neither of these claims has any merit.
To hold the Bar liable for failure to disclose that
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings, Baileys

*Baileys' allegation that the Bar should have taken some
action to prevent Calder from practicing law is without
merit for another reason. The Bar itself cannot take
any action which would prevent an attorney from
practicing law.
The Bar may only recommend to this
Court that an attorney be suspended or disbarred. Any
action to suspend or disbar an attorney is exclusively
within this Court's prerogative.
See Rule VII of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar.
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must first show that the Bar had some duty to disclose that
information

to them.

The Bar, however, has no duty to

disclose that an attorney is the subject of disciplinary
proceedings.

Indeed, the Bar is compelled not to disclose

that information pursuant to Rule VI(a) of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar which provides as follows:
All
disciplinary
proceedings
conducted by Bar Counsel before the
Ethics and Discipline Committee or
its panels shall be confidential and
shall not be a matter of public
record except as appropriate or
necessary
to
allege
and
prove
private
reprimands
or
private
admonitions under Rule VIII(h) in
the
case
of
waiver
or
where
affirmative
defenses
place
disciplinary proceedings in issue.
The pendency, subject matter and
status
of
an
investigation
or
complaint may be disclo$ed, however,
if:
( 1 ) The member
investigation
confidentiality;

of the Bar under
has
waived

(2) The disciplinary proceeding is
based upon the conviction of a
crime;
(3) The disciplinary proceeding is
based upon allegations that have
become
generally
known
to the
public.
The Bar had no duty to disclose to Baileys that
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings.
the

Bar

was

information.

under

an

obligation

not

Indeed,

to disclose

that

If Baileys1 verified complaint is construed to
-11-

allege that the Bar should have disclosed that Calder was
the subject of disciplinary proceedings, the complaint is
without merit.
Baileys also appear to argue that their complaint
states

a claim

that

they

Counsel regarding Calder.

received

bad

advice

from Bar

Baileys argue in their brief that

the Bar "should be held to the same standard of care as any
other

lawyer

17).

The

allegation

in the
verified
that

an

community"
complaint,

(Brief of Appellant, p.
however,

attorney-client

contains

relationship

established between Bar Counsel and the Baileys.

no
was

The only

"advice" Bar Counsel gave to the Baileys was that they take
advantage of an offer from Calder to "get this [bankruptcy]
matter settled once and for all" upon payment of $10.00 and
later that they contact Calder to have him proceed on the
bankruptcy matter he was handling for them and to complete
the matter upon payment of $15.00 (verified complaint, para.
14 and 18 at R. p. 6).
Bar Counsel and the Bar had no relationship with
the Baileys which would give rise to a duty to give certain
advice.

No

duty

could

possibly

have

been

breached

by

advising Baileys to return to the attorney who was handling
their bankruptcy matter to have him pursue it to completion.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/appellee Utah
State Bar respectfully
district

court's

requests

order

the Court to affirm the

dismissing

Baileys'

verified

complaint.
DATED this 6th day of August, iy90.

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

x

o

(JffliTOiPP
ROBERT H. REES
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellees Utah State Bar
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